The commentary by Savitz and Olshan (1) and the response by Thompson (2) form a fascinating contrast. Savitz and Olshan speak in the language of epidemiology, complaining about the seeming arbitrary and antiscientific dictates of conventional (frequentist) statistical methodology, particularly as it applies to the study of many associations. Thompson, speaking mainly in the language of statistics, takes us on a whirlwind tour of the foundations of statistical inference. He highlights, in particular, the problems with frequentist statistical methodology, supporting in spirit most of the points of Savitz and Olshan, but he ends up condemning the seeming arbitrary and antiscientific consequences of people disobeying the dictates of frequentist statistical methodology. Casual readers could be excused for being confused about what is actually being disputed. Perhaps more relevant, they may not see how the differences claimed here have any real meaning for how epidemiologists analyze, think, or write about their research. In this essay, I will try to show how the issue here is at the core of what epidemiology, and indeed science, is all about.
The commentary by Savitz and Olshan (1) and the response by Thompson (2) form a fascinating contrast. Savitz and Olshan speak in the language of epidemiology, complaining about the seeming arbitrary and antiscientific dictates of conventional (frequentist) statistical methodology, particularly as it applies to the study of many associations. Thompson , speaking mainly in the language of statistics, takes us on a whirlwind tour of the foundations of statistical inference. He highlights, in particular, the problems with frequentist statistical methodology, supporting in spirit most of the points of Savitz and Olshan, but he ends up condemning the seeming arbitrary and antiscientific consequences of people disobeying the dictates of frequentist statistical methodology. Casual readers could be excused for being confused about what is actually being disputed. Perhaps more relevant, they may not see how the differences claimed here have any real meaning for how epidemiologists analyze, think, or write about their research. In this essay, I will try to show how the issue here is at the core of what epidemiology, and indeed science, is all about.
The first step is to identify the real issue for which the methodological arguments are a proxy. The most telling clues are found in the conclusions of each paper. The final sentence of Savitz and Olshan's conclusion states that the context in which ideas originate and the perspective of the investigators "offer little guidance in assessing the study's scientific contribution" (1, p. 907). Thompson says that if p values are to be used, we need to adjust them to "preserve their one merit, the protection against type I errors" (2, p. 804). He says the failure to do so, combined with inattention to the method of hypothesis generation, would be "license to publish coincidences with a pseudoscientific gloss" (2, p. 804).
Aha! It is no coincidence that the adjective "scientific" plays a central role in each conclusion. The scientific arguments that invariably generate the most heat are those concerned with what conclusions or methods are within the domain of science itself. Although not always obvious, that is the issue at the heart of these essays. I will attempt to show here where the "science" is in the multiple comparisons debate and, in doing so, hopefully take a step toward its resolution.
I will start with a critical distinction to which I believe Thompson does not do full justice-that between the Fisherian p value and the hypothesis test of Neyman and Pearson. He notes that they are "different," but suggests that the difference is more of perspective, rather than a fundamental incompatibility. He effectively blurs the distinction entirely when he speaks of p values providing "protection against type I errors" (2, p. 804), the latter being purely a hypothesistesting concept. It is no coincidence that the divide between Fisher and Neyman regarding the proper approach to statistical inference centered on the same issue at the core of the present dispute, that is, what constituted a proper scientific method.
I and others (3-7) have written extensively on this debate, and so I will not recapitulate it in full here. However, it is essential to understand its key elements. As noted by Thompson (2) , R. A. Fisher proposed the p value as a measure of the statistical distance between the observed data and a single null hypothesis, to be interpreted as a measure of statistical evidence. It was to be used somewhat informally in the fluid and nonquantifiable process of scientific inference. It was not an error rate.
Neyman and Pearson (8) noted that Fisher's approach was not a complete system of non-Bayesian inference, so they proposed their own, which involved two competing hypotheses and a new notion of "error rates." Neyman and Pearson clearly recognized that use of hypothesis tests was not compatible with measuring evidence. Their own words still describe the situation best: 807 808 Goodman ...no test based upon a theory of probability can by itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of a hypothesis.
However, we may look at die purpose of tests from another viewpoint. Without hoping to know whether each separate hypothesis is true or false, we may search for rules to govern our behavior with regard to them, in following which we ensure that, in the long run of experience, we shall not often be wrong (8, pp. 3-4) .
Understanding this passage is the necessary first step to the understanding the multiple comparisons problem. It states that if we are going to base a system of inference only on "direct" (i.e., deductive, objective) probabilities, we must give up any attempt to judge the truth or falsehood of particular hypotheses. This is merely a statement of logic because if a system is purely deductive, by definition it can have no inductive component that reflects back from the data to the underlying hypotheses. Another perspective is that an error rate is a defined set (e.g., a rejection region), and if one tries to isolate the meaning of a specific result within that set, one loses the value of defining the set in the first place. However, if pure objectivity requires relinquishing what many scientists see as the sine qua non of scientific investigations, the evaluation of evidence for or against a hypothesis, what does that say about science? Neyman conveniently solved this by proposing that science was as an enterprise not of reasoning, but of following rules with fixed frequency properties. These "properties" could only be appreciated if we averaged over repeated application of the rules, i.e., they had no meaning in a single experiment. In place of inductive reasoning, Neyman suggested that we regard following these rules as acts of "inductive behavior" (9) .
Most of what Neyman and Pearson said were simple statements of mathematical and logical fact. However, their attempt to limit the scope of science to its purely deductive elements was part of a philosophical current at the time that attempted to rid science of its subjective component. Karl Popper (10) attempted to do this in a way similar to that of Neyman and Pearson by defining science as the deductive testing of falsifiable statements and consigning the rest of the enterprise to the nonscientific dustbin. His philosophy, while having great impact, failed as a satisfactory description of either how science was or should be conducted. Rudolf Carnap (11) and Karl Hempel (12) attempted a much more ambitious strategy: to codify the rules of inductive logic so that we could analytically explain how one could reason from observations to universal truths. They failed as well, although their attempt added much to our understanding of scientific reasoning and the limitations of pure logic.
The p value was not part of the hypothesis test, for good reason: It was not necessary. To retain the deductive cogency of the hypothesis test, it is essential that all results in the rejection region be reacted to identically. Any attempt to determine whether one result is more likely than another within that region only results in trouble-trouble, because we would have to confront the implications of that difference without Bayes theorem, and no such calculus exists, and trouble, as well, because frequentist, "objective" probabilities apply only to sets, not to individual events. One can assign a unique probability to an individual event only if it can be placed in just one set and all members of that set are identical. The only examples of such situations are games of chance or random mechanisms with consistent physical properties.
The difference in probabilities that can arise from whether we distinguish between members of a set can be quite dramatic. For example, we read almost daily about winners of state lotteries. From the perspective of the winner, an event with a one-in-a-million probability has occurred. From the perspective of others, an event with probability 1.0 has happened; someone had to win. Which one is right? Both are. Which one we focus on corresponds to the set in which we place the winner-with all people who bought tickets or in a set by him-or herself. There are two determinants of this decision: if the winner was identifiably different from others in a way that might be related to his or her chances of winning, and whether there are any consequences of not being so identified. For example, if we discovered that the winner was a computer hacker with a penchant for manipulating state lottery machines, the one-in-a-million probability would start to look relevant, as it would if the winner was the daughter of the lottery commissioner. This is because each of these scenarios suggests an explanation for how that individual's probability of winning differed from that of the average lottery player. Without such an explanation, we might just shrug our shoulders and turn the page.
A parallel situation occurs with insurance. My company assigns a certain probability to my car being stolen, typically based on only a zip code. This probability determines my premium. If I live in a safe part of my zip-code area, I might protest, saying I should not be lumped with those in neighborhoods to the east, but, rather, combined with safer areas to the north that are more "like" my area, or I might say that I live in a uniquely inaccessible and safe enclave. Alternatively, I might point to my deluxe home and car security system and say that I should be evaluated individually, meriting lower rates even than those of my neighbor. Each of these numbers are "right," but they are com-posed of different allotments of empirical measurement (e.g., the car theft rates within a defined area) and causal reasoning (e.g., the street is a dead end, the car is protected, etc.). The smaller the number of persons like me, the greater the work to divine an appropriate premium based on reasoning. The insurance company has very little to gain from expending resources for an individual risk assessment because, for them, only average loss over a population is relevant. In fact, the company's only motivation to distinguish between any risk groups is if another company undercuts them in a particular area, making it worthwhile to invest in a little risk assessment to preserve market share. Whether a company will be willing to do that for me is very doubtful, even if I have a good case. The difference in relevant probabilities has to do with one's ability to distinguish (on the basis of causal reasoning) between relevant members of a set and the potential consequences of not doing so.
It may seem that we have gone far afield of the hypothesis test/p value/multiple comparison debate. However, we are now right at its core. With the above points in mind, we will proceed with an examination of how the p value became insinuated into a method that appears incompatible. If there had been no way to measure evidence within the Neyman-Pearson system, it is quite unlikely that hypothesis testing would have the pervasive impact on biomedical research that it does. However, the p value, with its very peculiar structure, makes it appear as if one could measure the evidence provided by an individual result while still using only deductive probabilities. The p value is partly conditional (depending on the observed data for its calculation) and partly unconditional (depending on a class of observations that "could have been observed"). It is not a "direct probability," since, unlike the Type I error, it cannot be specified until after the experiment is over, but because the p value and the Type I error rate are both tail areas under the null hypothesis, the p value seems like a standard probability. This similarity also makes the reinterpretation of the p value as a postexperiment Type I error rate seem natural and look like it does not violate the basic logic of the hypothesis test. Because the p value places a specific result within a seemingly unique set (of hypothetical results as extreme as or more extreme than what was observed), it appears to be a unique measure of evidence. This is a panacea for the naive, positivist view of science: It looks like an improved estimate of Type I error, it measures evidence "objectively," and if we make the measure of evidence equivalent to a measure of error, we have a formula for the scientific method. The question is, where is causal reasoning?
Causal reasoning enters stealthily, in the definition of the relevant set-stealthily, but not silently. The conditional and unconditional aspects of the p value maintain a very uneasy peace and do not provoke outright conflict until we deviate from the simplest of experimental designs. In a simple design, a fixed sample-size situation with one comparison, the unease is in whether the probability of the "set" (e.g., p = 0.03) is a proper measure of the weight of the evidence, since, in typical applications, the observed result is by definition the most probable member of that set. However, that is a fine point compared with the outright war that breaks out when we start to consider an issue such as multiple comparisons, or sequential trials, or meta-analysis, or stepwise regression. This is because in these settings the divide that the p value straddles-evidence and error-becomes impossibly wide. Why? Because we are able to assign a given result to several different sets, and the considerations that go into determining the appropriate set appear quite subjective. This is upsetting to those who feel that "scientific" reasoning is purely objective and can be embodied in statistical methodology.
Let us illustrate this with a multiple-comparisons example. Suppose we do a study and test 500 associations at the 5 percent level. We know that with probability £0.999 we will get at least one statistically significant result, 25 on average, even if no associations exist. Suppose there are 20. These are "explainable" by chance and could be dismissed as a group. Actually, if we were performing a hypothesis test, we would measure the collective disparity from the null hypothesis of all 500 results (via analysis of variance) and not even know or care whether any individual comparisons were significant. Such an analysis would find that the collective results had a high probability under the null hypothesis. As with the lottery example, this assumes that none of the tested relations are distinguishable from each other.
"Wait a minute!" scientists like Savitz and Olshan might cry, "We can distinguish between them." What they would be saying is that each comparison is qualitatively different and that each can be considered on its own logical merits, or lack thereof, informed by outside experimental evidence and causal reasoning. It is a claim that these relations are epistemically different, a philosophically important step. This is sufficient to restrict the domain of the relevant probability set to that comparison alone. In other words, it justifies calculating a p value (or likelihood ratio) for a single association. If one is interested in "protecting Type I error," that is handled by the global null hypothesis test; calculating p values for individual comparisons, adjusted or unadjusted, serves the qualitatively differ-ent purpose of judging individual associations. Once we have decided to look at comparisons individually, we pass through a trap door through which we cannot return. The only question now is the degree of evidence that must be achieved to claim that a given association is "real." That depends on the strength of the external evidence and causal reasoning in support of the association and on the costs of an incorrect decision.
I agree with Thompson that likelihood ratios or Bayes factors are the proper evidential measures, but that is a secondary issue for the purposes of this argument. However, it is useful to point out that Bayesian methods do not, in contrast to Thompson's claim, completely "solve" this problem. Even in a Bayesian setting, one has to decide whether evidence against the null hypothesis should be measured over the whole set of comparisons, forcing the sum of prior probabilities on all possible nonnull relations to equal 1 -Pr(// 0 ), or to assign an individual prior probability to each nonnull relation, with no constraint on their sum.
Once this decision is made, Bayesian methods offer a far richer and more intuitively appealing set of analytic options than do frequentist approaches (13, 14) .
This brings us to the real issue being debated here. I submit that it is the trust, or lack thereof, in our ability to make epistemic distinctions between different relations. To be concrete, it is a debate over our ability to judge how good a scientific explanation is for a given association, which is ultimately the foundation of our claim that we should judge associations separately. Thompson is profoundly distrustful of our ability to judge the cogency or force of these explanations, as seen when he says that after coming up with some relations in a data-dredging procedure "...reasons can usually be invented for why those are just the effects that would have been anticipated" (2, p. 804). Savitz and Olshan, with their frequent references to the body of knowledge in a field, from mechanistic to empirical studies, clearly place more trust in their ability, or perhaps that of the scientific community, to judge each explanation on its own merits, distinguishing between the ad hoc and the cogent.
What constitutes an explanation? This is a complex question that has concerned many philosophers of science and is beyond the scope of what can be discussed here (15) . Generally speaking, it is a series of deductively related statements that "predict" what was observed. The objective support of each statement in the chain can vary and can come from very different sources. In epidemiology, this subject it is typically dealt with somewhat informally, under the rubric of "causal inference" (16) . Sir Bradford Hill's causal criteria (17) , which were actually proposed as rough guidelines to evaluate claims of causal connection, are undoubtedly the most influential in epidemiology, although how much effect they actually have on practice and whether they should be modified are rich areas for debate.
The main focus of the paper by Savitz and Olshan, however, is not on what makes a good explanation, but rather on what they feel is irrelevant to that quality. They tear away the various crutches and fig leaves that are used to make evaluations of explanations look "scientific." For example, they say that whether an explanation is a priori or data driven should be irrelevant to an assessment of how good (or bad) it is. I agree with this. If it is indeed a priori, then presumably there is a body of evidence that led the investigator to think it up, and that evidence, plus the causal reasoning, can be presented for evaluation. If the evidence is not there, the fact that the hypothesis is a priori should not count in its favor. If it is purely data driven, presumably that body of evidence will not exist, and the explanation will be discounted accordingly. Finally, if it was data driven but leads us to discover a body of evidence of which we were previously ignorant, the combination of the hypothesis and that evidence should be no less credible than if they had been discovered in the opposite order.
Therefore, I agree with Savitz and Olshan that we must come face to face with the sometimes uncomfortably subjective nature of the most critical scientific cognitive activity-assessing the quality of our explanations. Ideally, we should be able to recognize good ones and dismiss weak ones. To admit that there is no formula for doing this does not render the process "unscientific"; it simply makes it human. Science is a creative human activity, distinguished from nonscience partly by virtue of the intersubjective consensus that the methods are designed to produce. Jacob Bronowski portrayed this in a simulated dialogue, in his series of essays, "Science and Human Values:" ...there exists a method of handing on the findings of physics to other people so that they usually accept them; there exists no such assured method in painting. But the method is only an exposition; it has nothing to do with the way that the finding entered the mind of the discoverer. The finding, in physics as much as in painting, remains a personal illumination; we help every student re-create it, but we cannot teach one student to create it (18, p. 104).
Even though I agree with Savitz and Olshan about what should not matter in judging explanations, I share Thompson's implicit distrust of the ability of many researchers to give adequate attention to the quality of explanations. Too often, one sees explanations akin to "the nutrient seems to act through a biochemical pathway that affects the liver." This is not what I call an explanation, but I think Thompson is concerned that many others would. If we are unable to distinguish the well grounded from the contrived, we could indeed drown in a sea of spurious claims. Anyone reading the lay press knows that this is not a baseless concern.
Although decried by many experienced epidemiologists, our discipline has seen increasing weight given to pure empiricism (i.e., "counting" knowledge) over causal reasoning and the synthesis of qualitatively different forms of evidence. We are certainly not alone; this has occurred in many other disciplines of science concerned with outcomes. Perhaps most visible is the current movement toward "evidence-based medicine." Although this represents an understandable and probably praiseworthy reaction against medical knowledge based too heavily on supposition and expert assertion, the question remains about what the optimal balance between empiricism and reasoning should be. The swing of the pendulum toward outcomes research in medicine has already provoked reactions, one interesting example being an essay entitled "What Physicians Know," published in the New England Journal of Medicine, but written by a philosopher (19) . In epidemiology, we have seen the publicity and furious debate provoked by articles or essays that criticize the profession for generating concern about too many spurious or minor risk factors (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) . The lay press seems to cite a "risk factor of the week." To the extent these factors are indeed spurious, I believe it derivies from an overemphasis on empirical results and lack of understanding of the limitations of statistical methods and measures. Ultimately, it reflects on the failure of researchers to pay serious attention to what counts for an adequate explanation and to put at least as much emphasis on that aspect of a paper as on the results from the latest statistical algorithm.
I will end with a quote from R. A. Fisher, in which he regards with dismay the profound shift in scientific philosophy that was represented by the absorption of his "significance tests" {p values) into "Decision Functions" (hypothesis tests). One might argue whether his significance tests were an ideal alternative, but one cannot dispute that he feared for the neglect of what he saw as the essential core of science: understanding and explaining to others what we see.
The concept that the scientific worker can regard himself as an inert item in a vast co-operative concern working according to accepted rules, is encouraged by directing attention away from his duty to form correct scientific conclusions, to summarize them and to communicate them to his scientific colleagues, and by stressing his supposed duty mechanically to make a succession of automatic 'decisions'...The idea that this responsibility can be delegated to a giant computer programmed with Decision Functions belongs to a phantasy of circles rather remote from scientific research. (29, pp. 104-5 ).
I will leave it for the reader to decide whether Fisher's nightmare fantasy came true.
